Abstract. Recently, Ajtai discovered a fascinating connection between the worst-case complexity and the average-case complexity of some wellknown lattice problems. Later, Ajtai and Dwork proposed a cryptosystem inspired by Ajtai's work, provably secure if a particular lattice problem is di cult in the worst-case. We present a heuristic attack (to recover the private key) against this celebrated cryptosystem. Experiments with this attack suggest that in order to be secure, implementations of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem would require very large keys, making it impractical in a real-life environment. We also adopt a theoretical point of view: we show that there is a converse to the Ajtai-Dwork security result, by reducing the question of distinguishing encryptions of one from encryptions of zero to approximating some lattice problems. In particular, this settles the open question regarding the NP-hardness of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem: from a recent result of Goldreich and Goldwasser, our result shows that breaking the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is not NP-hard, assuming the polynomial-time hierarchy does not collapse.
Introduction
Lattices are discrete subgroups of some n-dimensional space and have been the subject of intense research, going back to Gauss, Dirichlet, Hermite and Minkowski, among others. More recently, lattices have been investigated from an algorithmic point of view and two basic problems have emerged: the shortest vector problem (SVP) and the closest vector problem (CVP). SVP refers to the question of computing the lattice vector with minimum non-zero euclidean length while CVP addresses the non-homogeneous analog of nding a lattice element minimizing the distance to a given vector. It has been known for some time that CVP is NP-complete 12] and Ajtai has recently proved that SVP is NP-hard for polynomial random reductions 3].
The celebrated LLL algorithm 18] provides a partial answer to SVP since it runs in polynomial time and approximates the shortest vector within a factor of 2 n=2 where n denotes the dimension of the lattice. This has been improved to the bound (1 + ") n by Schnorr 21] . Babai 6] gave an algorithm that approximates the closest vector by a factor of (3= p 2) n . The existence of polynomial bounds 2 is completely open: CVP is presumably hard to approximate within a factor 2 (log n) 0:99 as shown in 5] but a result of Goldreich and Goldwasser 14] suggests that unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses, this inapproximability result cannot be extended to p n.
to be secure, implementations of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem would require very large keys.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the AjtaiDwork cryptosystem is described. Section 3 presents our heuristic attack (to recover the private key) and practical experiments. Sections 4 and 5 deal with a converse to the Ajtai-Dwork security theorem. Section 4 uses a CVP approximation oracle, while section 5 uses a SVP approximation oracle. The reduction obtained in section 4 shows that breaking the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is not NP-hard if the polynomial-time hierarchy does not collapse. Due to lack of space, section 4 and 5 do not include full proofs. These can be found in 20] . The appendix includes the missing proofs.
The Ajtai-Dwork Cryptosystem
In this section we recall the construction of Ajtai and Dwork 4] , with the notations and the presentation of 15]. For any " between 0 and 1 2 , we denote by Z " the set of real numbers for which the distance to the nearest integer is at most ". We denote the inner product of two vectors in the Euclidean space R n by hx; yi. Given a set of n linearly independent vectors w 1 ; : : : ; w n , the parallelepiped spanned by the w i 's is the set P(w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) of all linear combinations of the w i 's with coe cients in 0; 1 . Its width is the minimum over i of the Euclidean distance between w i and the hyperplane spanned by the other w j 's. Reducing a vector v modulo a parallelepiped P(w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) means obtaining a vector v 0 2 P such that v 0 ? v belongs to the lattice spanned by the w i 's, which we denote by v 0 = v (mod P). To simplify the exposition, we present the scheme in terms of real numbers, but we always mean numbers with some xed nite precision. Given a security parameter n (which is also the precision of the binary expansion for real numbers), we let m = n 3 and n = 2 n log n . We denote by B n the big n-dimensional cube of side-length n . We also denote by S n the small n-dimensional ball of radius n ?8 .
Given n, the private key is a uniformly chosen vector u in the n-dimensional unit ball. For such a private key, we denote by H u the distribution on points in B n induced by the following construction:
1. Pick a point a uniformly at random from fx 2 B n : hx; ui 2 Zg.
2. Select 1 ; : : : ; n uniformly at random from S n . 3. Output the point v = a + P i i .
The public key is obtained by picking the points w 1 ; : : : ; w n , v 1 ; : : : ; v m independently at random from the distribution H u , subject to the constraint that the width of the parallelepiped w = P(w 1 ; : : : ; w n ) is at least n ?2 n (which is likely to be satis ed, see 4]). Thus, an encryption of '0' will always be decrypted as '0', and an encryption of '1' has a probability of 2n ?1 to be decrypted as '0'. These decryption errors can be removed (see 15] ). The main result of 4] states that a probabilistic algorithm distinguishing encryptions of a '0' from encryptions of a '1' with some polynomial advantage can be used to nd the shortest nonzero vector in any n-dimensional lattice where the shortest vector v is unique, in the sense that any other vector whose length is at most n 8 jjvjj is parallel to v.
A Practical Attack
We describe in this section a heuristic attack to recover the private key. We rst present the ideas underlying our attack, the attack itself and then the ex- 
whose norm is less than n ? P m k=1 p n = n 3:5?n= log 2 n : Furthermore, log 2 (2m 0 n n + 1) n n log 2 (2m 0 ) + n log 2 n + n log 2 n + n log 2 (1 + 1) 2n + 3n log 2 n + n 2 + n 2 log 2 n We conclude since 2n+3n log 2 n+n : : : ; V n is an approximation of u (one does not need to know all the V i 's, n of them are enough). The approximation is good because hv i ; ui is close to V i (di erence less than n ?7 in absolute value) and the coe cients of A ?1 are very small (we omit the details but one can justify that they are roughly around ?1 n in absolute value, because the coe cients of A can almost be considered as independent and uniformly distributed over ] ? n ; n ).
The attack is the following:
1. Obtain vectors in V ? by nding short linear combinations of the v i 's using lattice reduction algorithms. omit the details here: it is related to the fact that, given a low-dimensional lattice, a reduced basis for the corresponding orthogonal lattice is much smaller than for the lattice itself (see 19] ). To nd enough vectors, one repeats the random selection of columns. Since short vectors are found in an apparently random fashion, one can expect to nd as many vectors as wanted.
For step 2, one has to compute a basis of the orthogonal lattice of a given lattice. To do so, one can use the polynomial time algorithm given in 19], which uses lattice reduction algorithms. But there is a more practical method here: since the orthogonal lattice is one-dimensional only, one can compute it by a basic cross product, that is determinant computations. Actually one does not need to compute the complete cross product: n determinants su ce instead of m, because in step 3, only n coordinates of V are used. Note that each determinant is a n log n-bit integer.
We used the NTL library 23] to conduct our experiments. Timings are given for a 170 Mhz Ultra-SPARC-I. We used the oating point variant (double and quadratic precision) of the LLL algorithm as our lattice reduction algorithm: no stronger algorithms were needed. Only steps 1 and 2 are time-consuming.
For n = 8, we reduced the complete 512-dimensional lattice : step 1 took 3 hours, step 2 took less than half an hour and step 3 was immediate. The approximation u 0 was matching u with the n-bit precision. For n = 32, we chose m 0 = 300 : each reduction of a partial 300-dimensional lattice gave 60 vectors in V ? in less than 4 hours. Actually, this running time might be decreased, as a complete LLL reduction is unnecessary. Hence, one could expect to nd enough vectors in less than 100 days on a single machine, and the computations can easily be parallelized (each random combination of 300 columns can be reduced independently) to reduce the running time.
Step 2 requires the computation of 32 determinants of huge but sparse matrices. The dimension of these matrices is 7 32; 767, and there are less than 300 non-zero entries per line, making the computation feasible. Assuming that step 2 determined the V i 's, step 3 immediately gave a perfect approximation of u.
Hence a successful attack even for n = 32 looks feasible. Note that at least n 5 log n bits are required to store the public key (the v i 's): for n = 32, this amounts to 20 megabytes, and the ciphertext for each bit is 6144 bits long. This shows that the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is hardly practical even with marginal security. 4 Deciphering with a CVP-oracle
We de ne an (n; k)-CVP-oracle to be any algorithm which, given a point x 2 R n and a n-dimensional lattice L, outputs a lattice point 2 L such that for every 2 L: dist(x; ) kdist(x; ); where dist denotes the Euclidean distance. Each oracle call made by a Turing machine contributes by a single unit to the overall complexity of the machine.
Using such an oracle, we will see how one can distinguish in probabilistic polynomial time ciphertexts of '0' from ciphertexts of '1', thanks to some properties of the keys. To any choice of the keys, we associate a particular lattice. Given a ciphertext, one can build a vector such that: if the ciphertext is a ciphertext of '0', this vector is likely to be close to the lattice ; and if the ciphertext is a ciphertext of '1', this vector is unlikely to be close enough. To check whether this vector is close enough, one calls an oracle. We show how to prove this result, which will be used afterwards. Let u be a By Markov's inequality, it follows that (1) is satis ed with probability at least 1 ? " 1 over the choice of w 1 ; : : : ; w n . Now, we assume that the the w j 's are xed and satisfy (1). We will prove that for su ciently large n, when ( 
Thus, by Markov's inequality, (2) is satis ed with probability at least 1?" 2 over the choice of v 1 ; : : : ; v m , which completes the proof of Theorem 4. To prove (3), it su ces to prove that for su ciently large n, for all choice of (b 1 ; : : : ; b m ), (3) is satis ed with respect to a random choice of (v 1 ; : : : ; v m ). The core of this result is the following basic lemma: Lemma 7. Let t on the n-dimensional unit sphere. Let s be a randomly chosen point (with uniform distribution) from the hypercube B n . Then E hs; ti] = 0 and E hs; ti 2 ] = 2 n =3: Proof (Sketch). Decompose s and t with respect to the canonical basis to express the dot product hs; ti. The result follows from a short computation, using the fact that the coordinates of s are independent random variables uniformly distributed over ] ? n ; + n . u t Now, we x b 1 ; : : : ; b m in f0; 1g and denote by X the random variable of (3), for which we want to bound the expectation.
Assume rst that the v i 's are independent random variables uniformly distributed over the hypercube B n . Then, applying Lemma To conclude, we show how to take care of the actual distribution of the v i 's.
Let a denote a point chosen at random from fx 2 B n : hx; ui 2 Zg. Let be randomly chosen in 0; 1 . Then, the sum a + u is uniformly distributed over an n-dimensional volume C n , which di ers from B n by points y such that the segment y; y + u] crosses the border of B n . Such points are within distance 1 of this border. It follows that one can bound the volume of the di erence of B n and C n by 2n n?1 n . Replacing the uniformly distributed variable v i by a i + i u chosen according to the above distribution, one sees that E X] is modi ed by at most 2n n?1 n = n n n(m n p n) 2 = 2n 9 n since each hv i ; w ? j i is less than n p n.
Noting that the actual v i is obtained from some instance of a i by adding a small perturbation vector i , and that 2n 9 n = o(n 4 2 n =3) as n grows, we obtain for su ciently large n, E X] n We know that the rst term of this product is less than "
And (1) bounds the second term. We conclude from all the inequalities obtained.
u t
If we collect these two propositions, we obtain a probabilistic reduction:
Theorem 10. There exists N such that for all ; 1 ; 2 > 0, there exists a polynomial time Turing machine taking a public key and a ciphertext x as an input and making a single call to a (n+m; n 4?(3 + 1+ 2)=2 = p (1+2n ? ? 2 )])-CVP-oracle which outputs a yes/no answer such that: for all n N, if the keys are picked at random as described in Ajtai-Dwork's protocol, then with a probability of at least (1 ? n ? 1 )(1 ? n ? 2 ), { If x is a ciphertext of '0', the answer is yes with probability at least 1 ?n ? . { If x is a ciphertext of '1', the answer is yes with probability at most 3n ? .
Proof. We let " 1 = n ? 1 and " 2 = n ? 2 . For su ciently large n (independently of 1 and 2 ), (1) and (2) are satis ed with probability at least (1 ? " 1 )(1 ? " 2 )
over the choice of the public key by Theorem 4. We let " = n ? and = ; n )-SVP-oracle such that: for all n N, if the keys are picked at random as described in Ajtai-Dwork's protocol, then with a probability of at least (1 ? n ? 1 )(1 ? n ? 2 ), the machine distinguishes encryptions of '0' from encryptions of '1' with polynomial advantage n ? .
Note: recall that the advantage " of a distinguishing algorithm A is such that P A answers correctly] 1 2 + ":
We will need a technical improvement over the computations of section 4 which reads as the following generalization of Theorem 4, proved in the appendix. The key to the improvement is to replace Markov's inequality by moments inequalities, using the multinomial formula.
Theorem 12. Let k be a positive integer. There exists M 1 and M 2 such that for su ciently large n: for any choice of " 1 and " 2 in ]0; 1 , any set of keys (u; w 1 ; : : : ; w n ; v 1 ; : : : ; v m ) picked at random as described in Ajtai-Dwork's protocol satis es the following with probability at least (1 ? u t
We now x some constants. Since 2 + 4=5 > 2 > 1 > ; 1 < + ; and 3 > 2(2 + + 1 ): We let " 1 = n ? 1 , " 2 = n ? 2 and " 3 = n ? 3 . We assume that the keys satisfy (4) and (5) (which happens with probability at least (1 ? " 1 )(1 ? " 2 ) for su ciently 13 large n). We will use our oracle as follows: let = n 2+ and consider a sequence Therefore, can be chosen strictly less than 3 + 3=5, and the result follows. Note: the above construction is non-uniform. Eliminating the non-uniformity requires \sampling" the test for the various distributions S i (see 13]). ; n )-SVP-oracle. In particular, the CVP-reduction implies that breaking the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is unlikely to be NP-hard.
We have also presented a heuristic attack to recover the private key, given only the public key. It has been successfully implemented in the case of small parameters, and latest expriments suggest that the attack could be applied to real-life parameters in a reasonable time. This shows that unless major improvements are found, the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem is only of theoretical importance. For (5), as in the proof of (2), we bound the expectation when the b i 's are xed. A rst bound is obtained when the v i 's are independent random variables uniformly distributed over the hypercube B n . Then, we show that with the actual distribution of the v i 's, the additional error is negligible, so that the bound of (5) is satis ed for su ciently large n, thanks to Markov's inequality.
For the rst bound, we generalize Lemma 7 with the same tricks we used to generalize Lemma 5. Let t = (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) be a vector in the n-dimensional unit sphere. Let s = (s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) be a randomly chosen point with uniform distribution from B n . 
